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Quesinberry v. Taylor
162 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 1998)
L Facts
At approximately 6:00 A.M. on September 25, 1989, George
Quesinberry ("Quesinberry") and Eric K. Hinkle ("Hinkle") broke into a
warehouse owned by Tri City Electric Company.1 Despite the fact that
they expected the building to be empty, Quesinberry was carrying a gun he
had taken from his step- mother's house.2 After gaining entry to the build-
ing by prying open a back door with a screwdriver, Quesinberry and
Hinkle stole a pair of walkie talkies, three rolls of stamps, and $200 in
coins.3 Thomas L. Haynes ("Haynes"), the owner of Tri City, found the
intruders in a warehouse office and asked them what they were doing.4
After Hinkle (to whom Quesinberry had previously handed the gun)
refused Quesinberry's demand to shoot Haynes, Quesinberry took the
pistol from Hinkle and shot Haynes twice in the back.' As Hinkle and
Quesinberry were leaving the warehouse they passed Haynes, who was
trying to push himself up off the ground.6 Quesinberry hit Haynes on the
head at least twice with the pistol.7
Quesinberry and Hinkle learned of Haynes's death from a television
report.8 Hinkle turned himself in later that day and gave a report implicat-
ing Quesinberry in the murder.9 Quesinberry was subsequently arrested
and also gave a report which described his part in Haynes's death." On
January 22, 1990, a grand jury indicted Quesinberry for capital murder,
breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny and robbery, and
the use of a firearm in the commission of the burglary, robbery, and mur-
1. Quesinberry v. Taylor, 162 F.3d 273, 275 (4th Cir. 1998).
2. Id.
3. Id. See also Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 218, 221-22 (Va. 1991).








der." On May 2, 1990, Quesinberry was convicted of all charges.12 On
May 4, 1990, during the penalty trial, the jury found both the future danger-
ousness and vileness statutory aggravating factors and recommended a
sentence of death. 13 The trial court adopted the jury's recommendation and
imposed the death penalty. 4 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the
convictions and the death sentence.' The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 6
After exhausting his state appeals," Quesinberry petitioned the federal
district court for a writ of habeas corpus." The district court denied the
writ and issued a memorandum opinion dated April 20, 1996."'
Quesinberry appealed to the Fourth Circuit.2"
On appeal, Quesinberry claimed the district court made the following
errors: (1) holding Quesinberry could not establish cause to excuse the
procedural default of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel;2' (2)
applying a procedural bar to Quesinberry's claim that the trial court vio-
lated Quesinberry's constitutional rights when it (i) inadequately instructed
jurors regarding Quesinberry's Fifth Amendment rights, (ii) received the
jurors' verdicts based on those inadequate instructions, and (iii) released the
jurors from the guilt phase proceeding; (3) holding as a matter of law that
trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to interview Eric Hinkle or






15. Id (citing Quesinberry, 402 S.E.2d at 218).
16. Id (citing Quesinberry v. Virginia, 502 U.S. 834 (1991).




21. This claim is not discussed in detail in this summary because the court of appeals
dealt with it by applying clearly established and widely understood legal principles and
because the default arose under now repealed state habeas procedures. In brief, the Fourth
Circuit rejected the claim on the sound reasoning that any deficiency in Quesinberry's state
habeas counsel could not excuse the default due to the fact that Quesinberry had no constitu-
tional right to effective state habeas representation. Id. at 276 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley,
481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (concluding habeas petitioner has no right to effective assistance of
counsel); Mackall v. Angelone, 131 F.3d 442, 446-49 (4th Cir. 1997) (same)).
22. This claim is not discussed in detail because the court's resolution of the matter is
based on factual circumstances peculiar to this case. In short, the court declined to grant
relief because it found Quesinberry had failed to meet his burden under either of the two
prongs of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984). The court of appeals found
that defense counsel's performance was not objectively unreasonable in that counsel had
private investigators interview Hinkle twice, moved for discovery, and determined that his
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and (4) finding that good cause had not been shown to grant Quesinberry's
discovery-related motions.3
II. Holding
The Fourth Circuit rejected Quesinberry's claims and affirmed the
district court's denial of relief.2
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Fifth Amendment Right Not to Testify Claims
Quesinberry raised several Fifth Amendment claims, all of which stem
from a single incident.2" Although both the trial judge and defense counsel
had earlier in the proceeding explained to the jury that it was not permitted
under the Fifth Amendment to consider the fact that Quesinberry chose not
to testify, the judge failed to do so when he read the jury instructions prior
to the jury's guilt deliberations. 6 Neither defense counsel nor the Com-
monwealth called the omission to the judge's attention." After the jury
returned a guilty verdict, the judge permitted the members to go to lunch
in the custody of the sheriff.2 Before doing so, he explicitly instructed them
not to talk among themselves or with others. 9 While the jury was at lunch,
testimony did not differ substantially from Quesinberry's confession or from that of the
medical examiners. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found that Quesinberry had not demon-
strated any prejudice resulting from his counsel's failure to exhaustively cross examine
Hinkle. The court reasoned that counsel chose not to do so in order to avoid focus on the
vileness of the crime and to avoid inadvertently providing the Commonwealth with damag-
ing testimony which defense counsel was unsure the Commonwealth possessed. Quesinberry,
162 F.3d at 278-79. For an exposition of the current state of ineffective assistance of counsel
law in Virginia, see Paige B. McThenia, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 385 (1999) (analyzing
Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860 (4th Cir. 1998)).
23. Quesinberry, 162 F.3d at 276. Quesinberry's fourth claim, that the district court
erred in denying his request for discovery, is not discussed in detail because of its cursory
treatment by the Fourth Circuit. In brief, the court of appeals concluded that due to its
resolution of claims 1 and 3, discussed supra, Quesinberry had failed to show good cause
under Rule 6(a) of the rules governing Section 2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code.
Quesinberry, 162 F.3d at 279 (citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908 (1997) (noting that
a court of appeals reviews a district court decision to grant or deny discovery for an abuse of
discretion); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969) (concluding that "where specific
allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are
fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore entitled
to relief, it is the duty of the court to [grant discovery]").
24. Quesinberry, 162 F.3d at 276.
25. Id. at 276-77.
26. Id at 277.
27. Id
28. Id
29. The trial court stated explicitly:
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the trial judge realized his omission and notified counsel thereof.30 Defense
counsel moved for a mistrial, and the judge denied the motion." Upon the
jury's return, the judge told the jury "[y]ou are instructed that the defendant
does not have to testify [and that the] exercise of that right cannot be
considered by you." He then asked the jurors to retire to their room and
state their verdict in written form. 2 The jury returned with a guilty verdict
approximately fifteen minutes later."
The Fourth Circuit held that, on direct appeal, Quesinberry based his
claim that the jury was improperly reassembled solely on Virginia state
law.34 Further, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Quesinberry's claim
on that ground. In his federal petition, Quesinberry attempted to couch
his claim in terms of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. 6 Because
Quesinberry had failed to "federalize" his claim on direct appeal, however,
the Fourth Circuit correctly refused to consider it on the ground that the
Supreme Court of Virginia had decided the matter on an independent state
ground and it was therefore procedurally defaulted.3
The court's resolution of this claim is a potent reminder of one of the
basic tenets of capital defense representation in Virginia: Every claim pre-
sented to state courts should be grounded in both state and federal law. As
is plainly evident from this case, the penalty for doing otherwise is the
categorical stripping of half the precious little due process a petitioner is
entitled to receive.
Douglas R. Banghart
[B]ecause the case zi oing on and there are other matters of such severity
that you must consider, do not talk among yourselves; do not let anybody talk
to you; do not let anybody approach you; ito not respond to any comments; try
to avoid what would be inadvertent communication from anyone of any source.
Id (citing Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 218, 225 (Va. 1991)).
30. Id
31. L




36. Id. at 276-78.
37. Id (citing Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (barring federal habeas
petitioner from raising constitutional claim which he failed to raise in state court); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-654(B)(2) (Michie Supp. 1998) (requiring, on penalty of subsequent default, state
habeas petitioner to raise all claims "the facts of which petitioner had knowledge at the time
of filing any previous petition"); George v. Angelone, 100 F.3d 353, 363 (4th Cir. 1996)
(noting that "[a] claim that has not been presented to the highest state court ... may be
treated as exhausted if it is clear that the claim would be procedurally defaulted under state
law if the petitioner attempted to raise it at this juncture")).
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